

1

00:00:00,500 --> 00:00:04,040
[applause]

2

00:00:04,640 --> 00:00:08,380
Well unlike Eric, I will not have a PowerPoint presentation, in part
because

3

00:00:08,389 --> 00:00:11,429
the subject and I'm gonna talk about
tends to be one that defies

4

00:00:11,429 --> 00:00:15,509
PowerPoint or at least imagery. I'm
discussing international communications

5

00:00:15,509 --> 00:00:20,300
in the 20th century as it relates to US
foreign relations and it tends to fall

6

00:00:20,300 --> 00:00:24,100
into either one of you categories:
submarine cables which go under the

7

00:00:24,100 --> 00:00:28,029
water and therefore are invisible or
high power radio transmitters, which

8

00:00:28,029 --> 00:00:31,619
sends signals from one high power radio
transmitter to another, which also are

9

00:00:31,619 --> 00:00:36,440
invisible. Therefore we have nothing to
be able to point to directly. Before I

10

00:00:36,440 --> 00:00:43,239
came down here I checked my mailbox and got the latest CIA FOIA letter
telling me

11

00:00:43,239 --> 00:00:48,170
that my information that I had requested

for... will not be available, the part that

12

00:00:48,170 --> 00:00:51,820

I have wanted. It's still heavily redacted.
So I'm in the middle of a subject that

13

00:00:51,820 --> 00:00:55,550

few historians have really looked at in
any great detail and the farther forward

14

00:00:55,550 --> 00:00:59,260

I go, the closer to the present that I
get, less and less becomes available,

15

00:00:59,260 --> 00:01:04,119

which presents a very interesting challenge. I wanna talk about the
book project that I'm working

16

00:01:04,119 --> 00:01:08,799

on, that I did during the sabbatical and
then put it into larger context of the

17

00:01:08,799 --> 00:01:12,520

overall project that I'm trying to do,
that I've been trying to do really

18

00:01:12,520 --> 00:01:17,090

since I started work on the dissertation
and coming out of the dissertation. The

19

00:01:17,090 --> 00:01:20,420

current book manuscript is an
examination of U.S. foreign relations

20

00:01:20,420 --> 00:01:25,560

between World War I and the end of World
War II and it's a study of how senior

21

00:01:25,560 --> 00:01:29,479

U.S. government and business officials
came to understand the significance of

22
00:01:29,479 --> 00:01:33,880
global communications technology. They
came to appreciate that this technology

23
00:01:33,880 --> 00:01:38,409
was a dual use technology. It had great
significance for diplomatic and military

24
00:01:38,409 --> 00:01:42,360
affairs, the way that a government or a
nation situates itself in the world

25
00:01:42,360 --> 00:01:46,119
relating to other countries and other
governments and it also had enormous

26
00:01:46,119 --> 00:01:48,970
financial and commercial significance,
because these were the things that

27
00:01:48,970 --> 00:01:53,799
allowed businesses and civilizations to
communicate with one another and as we

28
00:01:53,799 --> 00:01:57,409
saw the world globalized in the
beginning of the 20th century to the

29
00:01:57,409 --> 00:02:01,000
extent that it could, up to World War I
and then as it attempted to recover

30
00:02:01,000 --> 00:02:04,740
after World War I, more and more
officials began to really understand

31
00:02:04,740 --> 00:02:07,090
that this was something that was
critical to being world

32
00:02:07,090 --> 00:02:11,480

power. Different powers understood this faster and took steps to act with that

33

00:02:11,480 --> 00:02:15,980
knowledge sooner, but the United States came to understand this during World War I.

34

00:02:15,980 --> 00:02:19,560
And so after World War I the U.S. recognized this great significance and there were a

35

00:02:19,569 --> 00:02:22,670
number of key individuals who identified that you needed to have a worldwide

36

00:02:22,670 --> 00:02:26,230
network of submarine Telegraph cables and needed to have a worldwide network of radio

37

00:02:26,230 --> 00:02:30,099
transmitters that would allow information to go in and out from the

38

00:02:30,099 --> 00:02:35,489
United States in ways that allowed you to meet the country's requirements and this

39

00:02:35,489 --> 00:02:39,549
is what different officials in the State Department realized, different officials

40

00:02:39,549 --> 00:02:42,620
within successive presidential administrations recognized, and what

41

00:02:42,620 --> 00:02:45,650
different officials and the military recognized. And so they all recognized it,

42

00:02:45,650 --> 00:02:48,670
but they argued about it in different ways and sometimes they talked past one

43

00:02:48,670 --> 00:02:52,290
each other and sometimes they had a lot
of things in common with each other.

44

00:02:52,290 --> 00:02:55,420
In the end of the day what they wanted to
do was to make sure that the United

45

00:02:55,420 --> 00:02:59,349
States was at the center, the center of
things, so that as much as possible the

46

00:02:59,349 --> 00:03:01,970
United States was at the center of
global communications not on the

47

00:03:01,970 --> 00:03:05,549
periphery, that as much as possible the
United States was on the leading edge of

48

00:03:05,549 --> 00:03:10,049
the technology, as much as possible the
United States would be free from foreign

49

00:03:10,049 --> 00:03:13,410
influence, so that if there was a war
between some other set of powers, the

50

00:03:13,410 --> 00:03:16,510
United States would not be harmed by
this and if there was another war

51

00:03:16,510 --> 00:03:19,560
between the United States and other
powers, that the other powers would not

52

00:03:19,560 --> 00:03:24,190
have some way of harming the United
States in a means with a tool

53

00:03:24,190 --> 00:03:28,120
that had not really been understood or
appreciated by people today. And get some

54
00:03:28,120 --> 00:03:31,540
sense of what that would mean, imagine if
all of a sudden somebody came running in

55
00:03:31,540 --> 00:03:34,440
and said "guys check the Drudge Report, there's something really wild.
All of the banks

56
00:03:34,440 --> 00:03:38,010
have stopped working" and we'd all say
"what, why, have all the banks shuttered?" "No, the

57
00:03:38,010 --> 00:03:42,560
interbank connectivity is gone, some
sort of hackers set off some sort of thing and

58
00:03:42,560 --> 00:03:47,000
the banks can't talk to each other". And we
would all instantly go "whoa, this is

59
00:03:47,000 --> 00:03:50,440
significant, whoa, I never really thought
that this would be an area of

60
00:03:50,440 --> 00:03:53,720
vulnerability", but people worry about
this today and so this is the kind of

61
00:03:53,720 --> 00:03:56,280
thing that people would have worried
about at that time. Are there ways in

62
00:03:56,280 --> 00:03:59,410
which this new technology presents new
security threats to us that we don't

63
00:03:59,410 --> 00:04:04,840
have any reason to really know how to

deal with? What do we do? So the book that

64

00:04:04,840 --> 00:04:08,389

I am constructing out of this goes from
the twenties through the middle of the

65

00:04:08,389 --> 00:04:11,859

1940's and in the 1920's what was going on here was

66

00:04:11,859 --> 00:04:16,059

careful attention to international
conferences where the U.S. and other countries

67

00:04:16,070 --> 00:04:17,799

laid out the fundamental structure of

68

00:04:17,799 --> 00:04:21,430

the global use of radio communications.
The International structure that is used

69

00:04:21,430 --> 00:04:26,770

for high frequency radio, for all aspects
of radio, the WiFi connection between

70

00:04:26,770 --> 00:04:31,319

this laptop and that router, WiFi
transmitter up there with your cell

71

00:04:31,319 --> 00:04:34,710

phones. All of those things are operating
on radio frequencies, those radio

72

00:04:34,710 --> 00:04:40,020

frequencies were all scheduled around
the world in agreement in the 1920's

73

00:04:40,020 --> 00:04:43,260

and the agreement that was
reached was originally drawn up by the

74

00:04:43,270 --> 00:04:47,039

United States Navy and then that became
the American diplomatic position and so

75

00:04:47,039 --> 00:04:51,539
the world is organized according to the
needs of the U.S. Navy in the 1920's.

76

00:04:51,540 --> 00:04:54,620
there's more to it than that, but
we're gonna put the Navy out ahead on this one.

77

00:04:54,629 --> 00:04:58,060
In the 1930's as the Great
Depression intensifies, you get the

78

00:04:58,060 --> 00:05:02,419
looming aggression that will become a
great problem here. U.S. officials

79

00:05:02,419 --> 00:05:05,940
struggled to find ways to minimize
foreign influence over communications

80

00:05:05,940 --> 00:05:09,210
networks. Are there any dangers that we
need to worry about? Some of you have

81

00:05:09,210 --> 00:05:13,020
heard of the company ITT. Its original
form was as a giant international

82

00:05:13,020 --> 00:05:17,090
communications conglomerate and there
were grave concerns by some in the U.S.

83

00:05:17,090 --> 00:05:20,430
that the people running it we're not
actually U.S. citizens and that if that

84

00:05:20,430 --> 00:05:24,729
company acquired control over different
international search firms serving the

85

00:05:24,729 --> 00:05:28,889

United States, that foreign powers could shut the U.S> off from the rest of the

86

00:05:28,889 --> 00:05:33,610

world. This led to very bitter fights that persisted and remained in place as

87

00:05:33,610 --> 00:05:37,830

part of rumors that even today you'll find as underlying conspiracy theorists.

88

00:05:37,830 --> 00:05:41,639

The ITT executives who knew about the Holocaust and were part of it, they

89

00:05:41,639 --> 00:05:45,919

monitored things going on, they betrayed American officials in Germany, all kinds

90

00:05:45,919 --> 00:05:49,469

of rumors that were started in the 20's and 30's and that then got

91

00:05:49,469 --> 00:05:55,589

locked in and remained a part of this sort of interesting undercurrents of conspiracy history today.

92

00:05:55,590 --> 00:05:59,529

Now, complicating this as well, in the Great Depression was the looming

93

00:05:59,529 --> 00:06:03,050

collapse of the submarine telegraph industry. It was becoming an outdated

94

00:06:03,050 --> 00:06:07,389

technology. It was still very important and U.S. officials were worried that these

95

00:06:07,389 --> 00:06:11,419
companies would go bankrupt, sell their
assets to foreign powers, and then a

96
00:06:11,419 --> 00:06:15,690
critical infrastructure would be in the
hands of a foreign power. The other

97
00:06:15,690 --> 00:06:19,029
alternative was to simply merge them all
together with radios and to create a

98
00:06:19,029 --> 00:06:23,409
giant Monopoly, but even in the midst of
the new deal that very word was

99
00:06:23,409 --> 00:06:25,280
anathema, nobody wanted to be the
one

100
00:06:25,280 --> 00:06:28,889
caused a giant monopoly to come into
existence and the ending result was that

101
00:06:28,889 --> 00:06:32,790
nobody did anything and the full
business history of that remains to be

102
00:06:32,790 --> 00:06:37,130
told. The remainder of the work explores
the period from the international crises

103
00:06:37,130 --> 00:06:43,730
1939, 1940, 1941, through the U.S.
participation in 1941 to

104
00:06:43,730 --> 00:06:49,060
3, 4, and 5. Before the war came,
U.S. army and navy officials attempted to

105
00:06:49,060 --> 00:06:52,010
develop plans for integrating the

nation's commercial networks into the

106

00:06:52,010 --> 00:06:55,770

militaries, so that when war came you could simply flip a switch and all

107

00:06:55,770 --> 00:06:59,940

of these commercial resources would be available to the military. This raised

108

00:06:59,940 --> 00:07:03,780

complicated civil military disputes. How much can military officers work with

109

00:07:03,780 --> 00:07:07,760

civilians in peacetime? What do you do in those weird phases between war and peace

110

00:07:07,760 --> 00:07:12,030

and times of great crisis? Who's really supposed to be in charge when you're in

111

00:07:12,030 --> 00:07:16,000

war, civilians or military officials, especially when the civilians don't seem

112

00:07:16,000 --> 00:07:19,280

to know anything about the subject and the army officers in navy officers

113

00:07:19,280 --> 00:07:23,600

insist that they know all? Once the U.S. enters the war in earnest, the demand

114

00:07:23,600 --> 00:07:27,500

for communications far outstrips the capability. The preliminary assumptions

115

00:07:27,500 --> 00:07:31,430

about who operated what and where proved inadequate. What was supposed to be a

116

00:07:31,430 --> 00:07:36,370

Navy job turns into an Army job and
there are grave commercial rivalries

117

00:07:36,370 --> 00:07:40,640

with Great Britain that complicated the
wartime alliance and affected the

118

00:07:40,640 --> 00:07:44,850

ability to integrate British and
American commercial networks into the

119

00:07:44,850 --> 00:07:48,830

wartime requirements for all of the
Allied powers. This would become

120

00:07:48,830 --> 00:07:52,729

particularly pronounced in Latin America
where U.S. officials sought to drive

121

00:07:52,729 --> 00:07:56,570

out the Germans, block up the British, and
bring hemispheric communications under

122

00:07:56,570 --> 00:08:00,960

American control. But it became fraught
with additional difficulties, because

123

00:08:00,960 --> 00:08:04,140

then the question was which American
company was supposed to be the one

124

00:08:04,140 --> 00:08:08,100

buying up all these Latin American ones?
And the ITT folks come back into the

125

00:08:08,100 --> 00:08:12,200

story and become a very complicated
subject that we still have no full

126

00:08:12,200 --> 00:08:16,720

accounting of. Subsequent chapters
examine the diplomatic fight with the

127

00:08:16,720 --> 00:08:21,100

British over access to the British
Empire, to the unclaimed spaces of the world,

128

00:08:21,100 --> 00:08:23,230

various neutral powers and

129

00:08:23,230 --> 00:08:27,270

countries in the Near East, the internal
bureaucratic struggles between the

130

00:08:27,270 --> 00:08:31,490

military and civilians for who got to
control policy during the war and after,

131

00:08:31,490 --> 00:08:34,750

and their growing concern among
everyone about the fate of U.S.

132

00:08:34,750 --> 00:08:39,420

communications, companies, and interests
after the war is over

133

00:08:39,420 --> 00:08:43,400

temporary solutions to the earlier
collapse of the submarine telegraph industry

134

00:08:43,410 --> 00:08:47,800

meant that when 1945 arrived very
serious and complicated decisions had to

135

00:08:47,800 --> 00:08:52,820

be made. But for equally complex reasons,
Franklin Roosevelt failed to make a choice,

136

00:08:52,820 --> 00:08:55,910

the American officials involved decided
that they actually didn't know what on

137
00:08:55,910 --> 00:08:58,920
earth they were supposed to do and the
different powers within the executive

138
00:08:58,920 --> 00:09:02,530
branch fought each other in public in
front of Congress, over how they thought

139
00:09:02,530 --> 00:09:05,910
it should be done. And the book will
conclude with an analysis of how U.S.

140
00:09:05,910 --> 00:09:11,770
officials resolved in 1945 on what they
should do with some proposing a massive,

141
00:09:11,770 --> 00:09:15,250
massive conglomerate of all
international companies that were

142
00:09:15,250 --> 00:09:19,380
American, that did international
communications into a single firm, into

143
00:09:19,380 --> 00:09:23,080
which the Army's wartime network, the
largest in the world, larger than even

144
00:09:23,080 --> 00:09:27,600
AT&T's would be dumped in and then that
single giant Monopoly would be partly

145
00:09:27,600 --> 00:09:31,730
run and operated and owned by the U.S.
government, which would mean sotto voce,

146
00:09:31,730 --> 00:09:35,800
that the information traveling through the
network could be made available signals

147
00:09:35,800 --> 00:09:39,760

intelligence, but nobody was supposed to say that. The end result of all of that

148

00:09:39,760 --> 00:09:43,610
was a huge blow up involving the attorney general and President Truman

149

00:09:43,610 --> 00:09:48,380
and the ultimate solution was the one that remained in place and underlies the

150

00:09:48,380 --> 00:09:51,960
in worries about American intelligence monitoring U.S. communications to the

151

00:09:51,960 --> 00:09:56,960
present day. So the deals done in 1945 are deals that in a way are still with us

152

00:09:56,960 --> 00:10:00,750
today. Now this sounds like a very particular book, you'd have to know a lot

153

00:10:00,750 --> 00:10:04,100
about the history of technology and business and communications and foreign

154

00:10:04,100 --> 00:10:07,710
relations and military affairs, but let me explain briefly why it is that I'm

155

00:10:07,710 --> 00:10:12,170
working on this one, 1920's to 1930's. When I wanted to do was

156

00:10:12,170 --> 00:10:15,680
to try to follow up on the questions raised in the first book, a study of how

157

00:10:15,680 --> 00:10:19,890
the U.S. government worried in World War I about. This how it came to discover that this

158

00:10:19,890 --> 00:10:24,810

was an important tool to be a world
power and as I went looking forward

159

00:10:24,810 --> 00:10:27,460

to see whether any foreign relations
historians have worked on it, I

160

00:10:27,460 --> 00:10:30,040

discovered that none had, even though
there were some areas where we knew that

161

00:10:30,040 --> 00:10:34,070

there were a lot of things to be puzzled
out and the more than I dove at this,

162

00:10:34,070 --> 00:10:36,850

the more that I found that lots of different
historians who should have been working

163

00:10:36,850 --> 00:10:43,170

on it, weren't. So I began to try not to
derive a summit of analysis based on

164

00:10:43,170 --> 00:10:46,900

existing literature, but instead to
create the literature that I knew that I

165

00:10:46,900 --> 00:10:50,529

needed to write the summit of volume. So
this is going to be the first of three

166

00:10:50,529 --> 00:10:54,010

volumes. Hopefully I'll be able to get
through all three. The first will be the

167

00:10:54,010 --> 00:10:59,130

1920's to the 1940's, the second will then be a study of the early

168

00:10:59,130 --> 00:11:04,040

Cold War, from the outbreak of the Cold War '45, '46, '47, all the way through the

169

00:11:04,040 --> 00:11:08,540

Cuban Missile Crisis when we understand from the Kennedy

170

00:11:08,540 --> 00:11:12,600

Tapes, they took time in the midst of worrying whether they would all the

171

00:11:12,600 --> 00:11:15,380

obliterated, to worry if we get through this,

172

00:11:15,380 --> 00:11:18,740

how will we make sure in future to be able to communicate with the rest of the

173

00:11:18,740 --> 00:11:22,700

world in times of great crisis? And they actually assigned officials to begin to

174

00:11:22,700 --> 00:11:25,620

think about this, even when they were wondering whether or not the Soviet

175

00:11:25,620 --> 00:11:27,470

Ships would be turning around

176

00:11:27,470 --> 00:11:31,089

or whether we'd have to sink them and launch World War III. So that made for

177

00:11:31,089 --> 00:11:34,890

a good stopping point. The next book after that, the third one which I hope to

178

00:11:34,890 --> 00:11:40,440

write, will go from the height of the Cold War '63, '64, forward to the end of the

179
00:11:40,440 --> 00:11:44,000
20th century or at least at the end
of the Cold War. What I suspect is that I

180
00:11:44,000 --> 00:11:47,630
will not be able to write that book. The
materials available for the second one,

181
00:11:47,630 --> 00:11:53,250
1940's and 50's and 60's,
are now becoming declassified. The file I

182
00:11:53,250 --> 00:11:57,900
showed you is based on stuff 1953. The
CIA continues to be reluctant to release

183
00:11:57,900 --> 00:12:02,400
some of that and give you a full or at
least an interesting story and an

184
00:12:02,400 --> 00:12:05,240
interesting example of what I'm
discovering,

185
00:12:05,240 --> 00:12:08,850
I've unearthed evidence that has only been
declassified in the last 10 years, that

186
00:12:08,850 --> 00:12:12,120
the U.S. government worried during the
Eisenhower administration that the

187
00:12:12,120 --> 00:12:16,230
Soviet Union had the ability to jam all
international radio communications, all

188
00:12:16,230 --> 00:12:21,330
of it. So at the outbreak of war the
United States would have 0 capability of

189
00:12:21,330 --> 00:12:24,790

directing its military forces abroad.
Except through the submarine telegraph

190
00:12:24,790 --> 00:12:30,510
cables, which were increasingly outdated
and which could be cut by ships. If that

191
00:12:30,510 --> 00:12:33,920
happened, if the soviets jammed it the
United States would have 0 trans-pacific

192
00:12:33,920 --> 00:12:35,920
communications and 90%

193
00:12:35,920 --> 00:12:39,790
loss of its transatlantic communications
for as long as the Soviet Union wanted

194
00:12:39,790 --> 00:12:44,279
that to go on. The full effects of that
we don't fully know. Half the documents

195
00:12:44,279 --> 00:12:47,740
are still classified and some of the
ones that are declassified still have

196
00:12:47,740 --> 00:12:51,560
have redactions in them and I asked the
CIA and the State Department to arrange

197
00:12:51,560 --> 00:12:55,410
for the declassification of a testimony
by Alan Dulles, the

198
00:12:55,410 --> 00:13:00,589
director of the CIA at a National
Security Council meeting in 1953 and the

199
00:13:00,589 --> 00:13:05,519
CIA said "no, we cannot tell you what CIA
director Allen Dulles told President

200
00:13:05,519 --> 00:13:09,699
Dwight Eisenhower in a national security
council meeting, the full details of

201
00:13:09,699 --> 00:13:12,579
which for all other parts of that
meeting have been released, but whatever

202
00:13:12,579 --> 00:13:15,850
Allen Dulles was worried about regarding
Soviet jamming of international

203
00:13:15,850 --> 00:13:19,889
communications, we can't tell you. Maybe
in a decade,

204
00:13:19,889 --> 00:13:23,639
you can ask then". So there's a lot to be
learned and I appreciate the PDL and the

205
00:13:23,639 --> 00:13:25,940
chance to discover what I have
discovered. There will be a book coming out

206
00:13:25,940 --> 00:13:28,940
once I get it all written up, thanks. I'm happy to take questions.

207
00:13:34,020 --> 00:13:35,120
Oh I have one.

208
00:13:35,120 --> 00:13:35,620
Sure.

209
00:13:35,620 --> 00:13:44,560
Can you talk a little bit more about the nature of the archival
material that you're looking at? Is it all government or..?

210
00:13:44,560 --> 00:13:48,720
It's a mixture of both. So the starting
point is going to be the state

211
00:13:48,730 --> 00:13:53,500
department records: RG59 of the National
Archives, but what one finds in the

212
00:13:53,500 --> 00:13:56,750
40's and the 50's is that there
are now a growing number of participants

213
00:13:56,750 --> 00:14:00,100
in the discussions. So the record trail
leads you into the Department of Defense

214
00:14:00,100 --> 00:14:04,790
files, which include both the Office of
Secretary defense and the individual

215
00:14:04,790 --> 00:14:10,140
services. Prior to 1947, it's going to be
either Army or Navy discussing it

216
00:14:10,140 --> 00:14:14,400
directly. It also leads to other
interested parties. So the Federal

217
00:14:14,400 --> 00:14:18,590
Communications Commission is not an organization that really has a

218
00:14:18,590 --> 00:14:22,080
good history written of it, but in the
1930's and the early 40's

219
00:14:22,080 --> 00:14:26,660
they made a bid to try to run
international communications policy, to

220
00:14:26,660 --> 00:14:31,820
have a strong say in national security
decisions about things and I can go into

221
00:14:31,820 --> 00:14:32,930
more on that later.

222
00:14:32,930 --> 00:14:37,420
It also requires getting into what can
be gotten into of the personal papers of

223
00:14:37,420 --> 00:14:42,010
individuals who've left behind, but also
some of the corporations. And so I was

224
00:14:42,010 --> 00:14:47,410
able to go to the MCI records, which are
located at the Hagley, the DuPont family

225
00:14:47,410 --> 00:14:53,100
estate in Delaware. MCI is the successor
to all of the other companies through

226
00:14:53,100 --> 00:14:56,040
the 30's, 40's, and 50's...
20's, 30's, 40's, and 50's

227
00:14:56,040 --> 00:15:00,180
and 60's and they've got these
government records and they've got these

228
00:15:00,180 --> 00:15:04,660
business records and together with the
Western Union records at the Smithsonian,

229
00:15:04,660 --> 00:15:09,000
that's how we know what we know.
Unfortunately a great many other records

230
00:15:09,000 --> 00:15:13,080
were destroyed. Once the technology was
old and nobody cared, stuff got chucked

231
00:15:13,080 --> 00:15:17,320
out, but as a result there's all kinds of
stuff don't know and there's all kinds of

232

00:15:17,320 --> 00:15:20,320
stuff that we don't know that we don't
know which makes it even worse.

233
00:15:20,320 --> 00:15:31,000
So are the private companies and family archives ore willing to allow
you access or is there somebody from the CIA running, running,
running...

234
00:15:31,000 --> 00:15:31,820
[laughing]

235
00:15:31,820 --> 00:15:34,180
...flat lined out?

236
00:15:34,180 --> 00:15:39,960
There is their stuff at the MCI records.
Some of it just

237
00:15:39,970 --> 00:15:44,500
copies of government documents sent as a
courtesy, things like. And there are some

238
00:15:44,500 --> 00:15:48,440
government documents or at least
corporate halves of government

239
00:15:48,440 --> 00:15:51,860
corporation discussions that end up in
corporate records that maybe shouldn't

240
00:15:51,860 --> 00:15:56,900
be there and I'll leave it at that. [laughing]

241
00:15:56,900 --> 00:16:01,700
I'm curious, I'm good in asking you to speculate?

242
00:16:01,700 --> 00:16:02,200
Sure.

243
00:16:02,200 --> 00:16:10,060

When you come across redacted information and there's a sense to it's come back in ten years

244

00:16:10,060 --> 00:16:17,160

and you undoubtedly got access to information, which ten years ago, you couldn't.

245

00:16:17,160 --> 00:16:25,699

What's your sense of what's being kept secret at this point, you know and

246

00:16:25,699 --> 00:16:34,159

when you do finally get access to information are you surprised at perhaps it's benign nature or?

247

00:16:34,160 --> 00:16:43,900

all of the above, all of the above. In brief, the U.S. government has gone back and forth on just how much we're supposed to

248

00:16:43,900 --> 00:16:48,339

declassify and they're under president Clinton, discussions under Bush, some under

249

00:16:48,339 --> 00:16:52,290

President Obama, a push to make it so that if it's older than 25 years, it's now

250

00:16:52,290 --> 00:16:58,179

incumbent on the agency to justify why it must remain classified and that's be declassified and that's been a big

251

00:16:58,179 --> 00:17:01,879

boon. When I did the dissertation research I found a document from 1916

252

00:17:01,879 --> 00:17:05,399

that had only the year before been declassified, because somebody finally

253

00:17:05,399 --> 00:17:09,510

went and had to like check to see why it

was still classified and what it tends

254

00:17:09,510 --> 00:17:14,029
to be his documents that can potentially
embarrass the USS when dealing with

255

00:17:14,029 --> 00:17:18,730
another country, information that is
signals intelligence, which is a lot of

256

00:17:18,730 --> 00:17:22,819
why my stuff is still classified,
because it relates to "we are learning

257

00:17:22,819 --> 00:17:27,490
because we're monitoring" or "we are
monitoring and thus learning and we

258

00:17:27,490 --> 00:17:32,669
don't want to confirm" or it relates to
nuclear matters or it relates to

259

00:17:32,669 --> 00:17:43,350
personally identifiable information. This
is a letter from the Deputy

260

00:17:43,350 --> 00:17:47,820
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence. I

261

00:17:47,820 --> 00:17:52,350
knew who it is from other documents, but
they've blanked his signature because that's

262

00:17:52,350 --> 00:17:54,159
personally identifying information.

263

00:17:54,160 --> 00:18:00,380
Yeah I'm gonna go and steal an old
dead guys signature. [laughing] Or this one,

264

00:18:00,389 --> 00:18:04,760

Allen Dulles' signature is redacted.
Why? Well you can't copy Allen Dulles'

265

00:18:04,760 --> 00:18:09,980
signature. You might steal his identity. Okay, no, but they're following the rules of procedure.

266

00:18:09,980 --> 00:18:14,740
Some of it, actually very interesting and the best is to get the document that is

267

00:18:14,740 --> 00:18:19,610
declassified in one place and partially declassified in another and then compare

268

00:18:19,610 --> 00:18:23,539
them and say the most important thing in that, the thing that was declassified

269

00:18:23,539 --> 00:18:29,099
last must be the document part that they themselves think is most important. So what is it?

270

00:18:29,100 --> 00:18:35,450
And that leads to some very interesting discoveries. Yeah. Drew.

271

00:18:35,450 --> 00:18:42,070
This is sort of a historian's methodological question I guess and it may apply more to your second volume than you first,

272

00:18:42,120 --> 00:18:47,580
but do you have sort of a set philosophy for how to deal with those [inaudible] records?

273

00:18:47,580 --> 00:18:53,560
You know, we're always sort of trying to fill in the blanks of what we don't know no matter how accessible our sources are.

274

00:18:53,560 --> 00:18:58,280
So is there a standard way that you treat or plan to treat those things that you think

275
00:18:58,280 --> 00:19:01,280
might critical, but you just don't have?

276
00:19:01,280 --> 00:19:08,620
Mostly to -- and is Eric still here? I need Eric, because I need to
point to Eric to say -- No, I'm actually taking a page out from

277
00:19:08,620 --> 00:19:14,520
physicists and astronomers and saying
are there hints that I'll get

278
00:19:14,520 --> 00:19:15,440
someplace else

279
00:19:15,440 --> 00:19:19,799
of what this is? Maybe I'm not going
get to know what it is, but at least I

280
00:19:19,799 --> 00:19:24,500
can have some sort of a place holder and
then when I get into other records, if I find

281
00:19:24,500 --> 00:19:28,540
hints that's enough to be able to
confirm okay well there's something there.

282
00:19:28,540 --> 00:19:34,700
So I will then describe it and in its
absence, note at least the gravitational

283
00:19:34,700 --> 00:19:38,720
waves show me that there's disturbance there and there must be a
planet. I don't

284
00:19:38,720 --> 00:19:42,250
know what the plan is, but I'll leave it
in the narrative and someone else will

285
00:19:42,250 --> 00:19:45,250
come along later and discover that. That's what I'm hoping.

286

00:19:45,250 --> 00:19:47,690

Great dark matter analogy there.

287

00:19:47,690 --> 00:19:52,960

Absolutely, absolutely. The title of the third book: Dark Matter.

288

00:19:52,960 --> 00:19:55,260

[laughing]

289

00:19:55,260 --> 00:20:01,860

I need cool book titles. Just the movie? I wanted to use matrix for the second title and the editor

290

00:20:01,860 --> 00:20:14,100

from Oxford University press who handles foreign relations said "no, as cool as that is, no we can't use movie titles". [laughing] It will looked cliched. Yep.

291

00:20:14,100 --> 00:20:18,780

So you talked about the Soviet's ability to jam communications at all times.

292

00:20:18,780 --> 00:20:19,280

umhmm

293

00:20:19,280 --> 00:20:25,400

It kind of sounds like modern day hacking these days and how governments {inaudible} to kind of take some steps to prevent that.

294

00:20:25,400 --> 00:20:25,900

Yep.

295

00:20:25,900 --> 00:20:30,260

I was just wondering what kind of steps would the government at that time take?

296

00:20:30,260 --> 00:20:35,520

So I have an article that is being considered for publication now that addresses exactly that and what we

297
00:20:35,529 --> 00:20:40,940
get and this is also of used to historians
of science, because we don't have historians of science

298
00:20:40,940 --> 00:20:45,380
accounts on this. The federal government
decided to react to this by doing a

299
00:20:45,389 --> 00:20:51,200
crash course of directed technological
research. If in fact the jamming of the

300
00:20:51,200 --> 00:20:55,370
radio is occurring at these bands, is
there a way for us to push the signal

301
00:20:55,370 --> 00:20:58,610
into other parts of the radio spectrum to
make it impossible to jam or at least

302
00:20:58,610 --> 00:21:01,659
make it that we can mitigate the jamming
problems.

303
00:21:01,659 --> 00:21:06,370
Forward tropospheric scatter systems, the
large billboard radio transmitters which

304
00:21:06,370 --> 00:21:10,390
we still have been used in some parts of
the world today, that comes from it.

305
00:21:10,390 --> 00:21:14,630
I went looking once I learned of this to
the historians of radio to see when that

306
00:21:14,630 --> 00:21:18,480
technology came out, to see if the radio
historians had said "yay, it came at this

307
00:21:18,480 --> 00:21:24,179

time" and it's sort of virgin birth. It just kind of appears. Why? Because the research

308

00:21:24,179 --> 00:21:28,219
was classified until it was suddenly commercially viable and then it appeared.

309

00:21:28,220 --> 00:21:34,139
the Army uses and the military uses a frequency jumping system in, SINGARS is one of the names

310

00:21:34,139 --> 00:21:37,740
associated with that. Frequency jumping is created in the 50's as a way of

311

00:21:37,740 --> 00:21:42,490
dealing with Soviet jamming. We have there are hints-- and Drew, this get's back to the point

312

00:21:42,490 --> 00:21:46,860
you were making earlier -- there are hints that AT&T, which was at this time

313

00:21:46,860 --> 00:21:54,330
developing the undersea telephone cable, what becomes TAT1, laid TAT1 and

314

00:21:54,330 --> 00:21:58,000
then there was reason to believe from the documents hinting, I don't know if I

315

00:21:58,000 --> 00:22:01,460
can get the AT&T records to confirm this, but there are hints at the Eisenhower

316

00:22:01,460 --> 00:22:05,889
administration came to AT&T and said "good, now build us more" and that the

317

00:22:05,889 --> 00:22:09,690
reason for building them was not the commercial viability of these things, but

318

00:22:09,690 --> 00:22:11,360
instead national security.

319

00:22:11,360 --> 00:22:15,210
"Make it so we don't need the radios if
we get jammed". And they do. Over ten years they

320

00:22:15,210 --> 00:22:19,059
build three more, each successfully more
powerful than last, pushing the

321

00:22:19,059 --> 00:22:21,890
technology forward and their end result:

322

00:22:21,890 --> 00:22:26,410
We can call anybody anywhere in the
world today because the Eisenhower

323

00:22:26,410 --> 00:22:32,460
administration said we don't want to be
cut off. Are there other things? I have hints and whatever

324

00:22:32,460 --> 00:22:36,350
Allen Dulles is talking about, but I don't know. Other questions?